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A B S T R A C T
We provide evidence on the effects of the 2009 crisis on Turkish
manufacturing. The exploration of ﬁrm and ﬁrm-product extensive
and intensive margins conﬁrms the prevalence of the latter in the
fall of export sales and discloses the former’s relevance in the
dramatic import contraction. The analysis of ﬁrm and product
heterogeneity reveals that productivity drove the negative evolu-
tion of the export intensive margin to such an extent that it
signiﬁcantly affected trade extensive margins and postponable
goods were the most affected products. In addition, the foreign
demand shock suffered by exporters propagated to their import
demand. Interestingly, we show that the crisis hit produced exports
less than the carry-along ones and that the domestic market
cushioned the downturn effects especially for larger ﬁrms. This
hints at the importance of domestic counter-cyclical policies.
 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
The recent global ﬁnancial and economic downturn has become one of the main topics in academic
debate. The initial ﬁnancial sector downturn propagated to the real economy and, in particular, the drop
in global trade in the ﬁrst quarter of 2009 was about 30% on average compared to the previous year
(WTO, 2010). The emerging academic consensus is that credit constraints were not the main issue1
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E-mail addresses: a.loturco@univpm.it (A. Lo Turco), d.maggioni@univpm.it (D. Maggioni).
1 On the contrary, Chor and Manova (2012) ﬁnd with U.S. data that credit conditions were an important channel through
which the crisis affected trade volumes.
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mostly caused by a demand shock, driven by the evolution of commodity prices and the fall in the demand
for postponable goods (Baldwin, 2009).
Among the explanations of the global crisis, the role played by international vertical linkages has
received great attention. Firms involved in supply chains should show greater resilience due to the
high costs of disrupting long-term relationships (Altomonte and Ottaviano, 2009). At the same time,
though, they contributed to the immediate transmission of the downturn in demand from the largest
importers (the US, the EU and Japan) to the more peripheral suppliers. International networks of
ﬁrms may thus have importantly favoured shock propagation across the world. Despite the fact that
idiosyncratic shocks at the ﬁrm level may importantly determine aggregate dynamics (Gabaix,
2011), only a limited number of studies have dealt with the trade effects of the global recession at
ﬁrm level.
We thus aim at shedding light on the micro-dynamics that shape the evolution of macro
phenomena by providing ﬁrm and ﬁrm-product level evidence on the crisis impact on trade
intensive and extensive margins in the Turkish economy. We especially intend to dissect the role of
ﬁrm size, efﬁciency and international exposure in driving the country’s response to the recent
downturn.
Larger and more productive ﬁrms may be less affected by credit restrictions (Greenaway et al.,
2007; Muuˆls, 2008; Manova, 2013) and should be more resilient when facing tougher competition
(Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008) and external shocks. At the same time, however, they could be more
exposed to the demand slump due to the concentration of their sales in the most severely hit markets
(Bricongne et al., 2012) and goods. Exiting the export market may however be rather costly for larger
and more efﬁcient ﬁrms (Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al., 2003; Arkolakis, 2010; Eaton et al., 2011b) and
therefore they might decide to shed only the lowest-competence varieties from their export/product
mix and to focus on their core products (Nocke and Yeaple, 2006; Eckel and Neary, 2010; Bernard et al.,
2011b; Mayer et al., 2011). A product extensive margin adjustment should therefore be observed. Also,
under uncertainty, large ﬁrms may contract their orders and nevertheless maintain their sales by
making use of their larger inventory (Alessandria et al., 2010). This could be followed by a drop
especially in the product level extensive margin, as larger inventories allow for the interruption of
several marginal inputs’ purchases.
The inspection of ﬁrms’ international involvement allows us to understand whether international
supply chains favoured crisis propagation or, on the contrary, helped to cushion the external shock.
We can expect the positive impact of importing on exporting shown in the literature (Muuˆls and Pisu,
2009; Aristei et al., 2013; Lo Turco and Maggioni, 2013) to be even more important in a crisis: when the
export market shrinks, cheaper/higher quality inputs may help to preserve competitiveness in the
foreign market. However, an opposite result could emerge if foreign suppliers shut down their
operations and domestic ﬁrms ﬁnd no domestic substitutes for the missing imported inputs. Also, the
fall in ﬁrms’ exports may propagate to their imports. By the same token, despite the fact that intra-
group ﬁnancial resources may cushion adverse upcoming credit conditions (Kolasa et al., 2010; Alfaro
and Chen, 2012), foreign ﬁrms’ deep international involvement may above all expose them to the
economic downturn originating in foreign markets.
The role that ﬁrm size, efﬁciency and international activity had in shaping the trade effects of the
crisis is therefore ambiguous and calls for an empirical investigation. Also, as the crisis hit trade more
than domestic sales, the impact of ﬁrm and product heterogeneity on the intensive and extensive
margins of overall ﬁrm turnover is worthy of investigation. We aim to highlight whether the pattern of
export sales drove the evolution of overall sales or, on the contrary, in the light of domestic counter-
cyclical ﬁscal policy interventions (Misch and Seymen, 2012), domestic sales cushioned the adverse
effects of the negative international context. Previous evidence has shown that large ﬁrms account for
a great part of the export collapse, while foreign ﬁrms appear to be generally more resilient2 (Wagner,
2012; Bricongne et al., 2012; Aisen et al., 2012; Alfaro and Chen, 2012; Kolasa et al., 2010). Compared
to this literature we provide some original contributions.2 On the contrary, Behrens et al. (2012) for Belgium and Godart et al. (2011) for Ireland ﬁnd no difference between foreign and
domestic ﬁrms in trade growth and exit rates, respectively.
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we deliver a more detailed picture of manufacturing ﬁrms’ reactions under shock. Our analysis may
therefore suggest which tailored policy interventions should be adopted in support of trade and
turnover during a crisis. In particular, unveiling the evolution and relevance of the trade extensive
margin in the downturn may help to understand whether there is room for policy actions directed to
ease the ﬁrms’ search for new sources or destination markets. Differently from previous evidence,3 in
the present work we especially test the relevance of ﬁrm and product heterogeneity in shaping both
ﬁrm and ﬁrm-product trade extensive margins’ response to the crisis and show that neglecting the
exploration of the extensive margin would leave out part of the story of the 2009 trade collapse in the
Turkish economy.
Second, as our data allow us to distinguish produced and non-produced (Carry Along Trade, CAT)
exports (Bernard et al., 2011a, 2012), we explore whether and how the crisis affected the two types of
activities. CAT exports generally stem from the activity of ‘‘indirect exporters’’ that may be more
exposed to external shocks due to their smaller size and their limited ﬁnancial and managerial
resources. Also, a direct buyer-supplier linkage is missing for CAT products and this could result in
looser business relationships, which could be more easily broken when an external shock hits the
foreign buyer.
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, this work is one of the few (Paravisini et al., 2011; Aisen et al.,
2012) to analyse the response of an emergent economy to the 2009 crisis at the ﬁrm level. In our view
Turkey is an interesting case since the country was seriously hit by the global recession despite its
sustained pre-crisis growth rates and its peripheral position in the international ﬁnancial system. The
sharp decline in GDP (5% in 2009) was unprecedented with respect to the country’s own recent
history and to other countries’ experience in the 2008–09 global turmoil (Uygur, 2010). Furthermore,
the demand drop in the EU meant a signiﬁcant 24% export contraction in 2009. In the same way,
imports dropped by 27%. The Turkish trade collapse may well reﬂect a compositional effect due to the
predominance of postponable goods in the country’s trade pattern. Turkey occupies a growing role
within the worldwide supply chains, as witnessed by its increasing weight in world capital and
intermediate exports,4 and therefore represents a worthwhile setting to analyse the propagation of
the real effects of an international crisis and the ﬁrm level response.
This work is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the data and some evidence of the crisis
impact on the Turkish economy. Section 3 describes our empirical strategy, and Sections 4 and 5
present the results and discuss the ﬁndings, respectively. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data and descriptive statistics
The sample. Our sample originates from merging the Turkish Annual Industrial Product Statistics
(AIPS) with the Structural Business Statistics (SBS) and the Foreign Trade Statistics (FTS) databases.
These sources provide information on sales and trade by product and on several ﬁrm characteristics
for all ﬁrms with more than 20 persons employed in the 2005–2009 period.5 In particular, we will limit
our study on the three-year 2007–2009 subsample, thus comparing ﬁrms’ 2009 crisis growth rates
with the 2008 pre-crisis ones.
In the following sections sold products are deﬁned according to the 10 digit PRODTR classiﬁcation,
while import and export products are deﬁned following the more detailed 12 digit harmonised GTIP3 The adoption in previous studies of either midpoint growth rates (Aisen et al., 2012; Bricongne et al., 2012) or the number of
entering and continuing ﬁrms exporting a given variety (Paravisini et al., 2011) makes it difﬁcult to infer how ﬁrm and product
heterogeneity actually affected trade at the extensive margin. Kolasa et al. (2010) investigated ﬁrms’ market exit rates, but they
left out the ﬁrm-product margin and several dimensions of ﬁrm heterogeneity as extensive margin determinants. Behrens et al.
(2012) on the other hand explore several ﬁrm heterogeneity dimensions, but totally omit the analysis of ﬁrm and product level
extensive margin determinants.
4 Compared to other emergent and developing economies in the pre-crisis period, Turkey experienced higher capital and
intermediate trade growth. In particular, in 2007 the growth of Turkish exports (imports) of capital and intermediate goods was
31% (21%) vis-a`-vis the 13% (19%) export growth recorded in the same goods categories by the remainder of the emerging and
developing economies.
5 The ﬁrms in our sample represent more than 75% of the Turkish manufacturing output and employment, and an even higher
fraction of the overall export and import ﬂows of the country.
Table 1
Number of products and overall intensive margin in trade and sales.
Year Z J V D%Z D%J D%V
Exports
2007 70,876,137 8822 8034 14.94 1.02 13.79
2008 85,062,462 8743 9729 20.02 0.90 21.10
2009 74,864,340 8683 8622 11.99 0.69 11.30
Imports
2007 99,909,322 10,202 9793 9.79 0.55 9.19
2008 114,280,517 10,162 11,246 14.38 0.39 14.83
2009 93,799,635 9876 9498 17.92 2.81 15.54
Sales
2007 302,060,931 3117 96,908 12.21 1.14 13.50
2008 332,323,644 3158 105,232 10.02 1.32 8.59
2009 308,193,496 3216 95,831 7.26 1.84 8.93
Our elaborations are from AIPS, SBS and FTS data. Trade and sales values are in thousands of Turkish liras. D stands for the
percentage change of the relevant variable between t and t1.
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classiﬁcation in the regression analysis. Further details on the databases are available in Appendix A.
The combination of trade and production data allows us to distinguish produced exports – ‘‘regular
exports’’ in the remainder – from the bulk of ﬁrm exports and thus introduces an important novelty in
the analysis of crisis effects. Recent evidence has in fact shown that only a share of a ﬁrm’s exports
corresponds to its own production and only a few ﬁrms export their own products only (Bernard et al.,
2011a, 2012). Turkish exports present the same pattern (Lo Turco and Maggioni, 2012), and we will
show that isolating regular exports from overall exports often delivers different insights on the ﬁrm’s
response to the crisis.
Decomposing trade and sales growth. To describe the contribution of the extensive and intensive
margins to the evolution of Turkish aggregate exports, imports and sales before and during the crisis,
we start by exploring changes in the number of traded/produced products (J) and the average traded/
produced values by product (V) in the pre-crisis years and in 2009 for all of our variables of interest (Z).
Table 1 shows that most of the decline in both trade and turnover was accounted for by the reduction
of average values. The drop in the number of imported goods actually played a more signiﬁcant role
only in the case of imports. On the contrary, in the case of sales an increase in the number of sold
products is recorded. This simple decomposition already highlights the general intensive margins’
predominance in the dynamics of trade and sales and indicates the peculiar relevance of the import
extensive margins during the global turmoil.
In order to dig into this evidence, we explore ﬁrm-product extensive and intensive margin
dynamics in the crisis. Following an analogous decomposition by Goldberg et al. (2010), let Zfpt denote
exports (imports or sales, alternatively) for ﬁrm f in variety p at time t. Firm f belongs to one of the
three mutually exclusive groups denoted by B, D and C, which represent the set of entering, exiting and
continuing exporters/importers/sellers respectively. Then, let P index the set of continuing products,
i.e. those that the ﬁrm trades/sells both in t and t-1, and E the set of entering or exiting products, i.e.
those traded/sold only in t or t-1. Now, further decomposing set E in the set of product additions, A, and
droppings, D, and splitting set P into the sets of growing, G, and shrinking, S, products, the overall
relative change of our outcome of interest in the economy can be deﬁned as:
DZt ¼
X
i 2 B
DZ ft þ
X
f 2 D
DZ ft þ
X
f 2 C
X
p 2 A
DZ f pt þ
X
p 2 D
DZ f pt þ
X
p 2 G
DZ f pt þ
X
p 2 S
DZ f pt
0
@
1
A (1)
As is the standard in trade literature, a variety p indexes a speciﬁc product-market combination.
Table 2 displays such decomposition for the growth of overall, capital, intermediate and ﬁnal goods
Table 2
Decomposition of ﬁrm trade growth.
Year D % D % Extensive – Firm D % Continuing Firms D % Exten-
sive – Variety
D % Intensive – Variety
Total Net Entry Exit Net Additions Droppings Net Growing Shrinking
Exports
All Goods
2007 1494 0.14 1.16 1.02 5.41 1700 11.59 9.39 29.42 20.02
2008 20.02 0.41 1.09 1.50 7.64 18.63 10.99 12.79 32.62 19.84
2009 11.99 0.04 1.09 1.13 0.41 14.54 14.13 12.35 20.62 32.97
Capital Goods
2007 29.78 1.90 3.87 1.97 7.01 21.47 14.45 20.87 32.85 11.97
2008 23.59 0.25 2.22 1.97 8.61 22.05 13.44 14.73 29.14 14.41
2009 25.40 0.88 2.20 3.08 1.51 14.57 16.08 23.01 12.25 35.26
Final Goods
2007 8.00 0.23 1.48 1.71 3.02 11.13 8.11 5.20 27.36 22.16
2008 7.06 0.34 1.35 1.69 3.46 11.14 7.69 3.95 27.46 23.51
2009 3.78 0.70 2.15 1.45 4.53 12.78 8.25 1.45 27.55 29.01
Intermediates
2007 15.97 0.20 1.09 0.88 6.59 19.61 13.02 9.17 30.02 20.85
2008 29.38 0.40 1.24 1.63 10.39 22.74 12.35 19.39 38.26 18.87
2009 17.83 0.32 0.58 0.90 1.63 15.12 16.75 15.87 18.97 34.85
Imports
All Goods
2007 9.79 0.35 0.79 0.44 3.27 18.86 15.59 6.17 28.14 21.96
2008 14.38 0.00 0.53 0.53 2.29 16.61 14.32 12.10 32.14 20.04
2009 17.92 0.85 0.18 1.03 2.09 14.51 16.60 14.98 17.50 32.47
Capital Goods
2007 1.37 0.83 3.60 2.78 1.57 32.38 30.82 1.03 23.21 24.23
2008 0.33 1.01 3.54 2.53 3.10 28.36 31.46 2.42 24.96 22.54
2009 14.97 1.28 2.02 3.30 6.70 24.31 31.01 6.99 19.81 26.80
Final Goods
2007 2.09 0.61 1.39 0.79 4.52 13.43 8.92 7.22 16.80 24.01
2008 14.04 0.07 1.26 1.33 2.52 12.90 10.38 11.59 29.99 18.40
2009 8.90 0.94 0.75 1.69 6.69 15.58 8.89 3.15 25.28 22.13
Intermediates
2007 12.30 0.31 0.75 0.43 3.50 16.74 13.24 8.49 29.91 21.43
2008 16.46 0.21 0.33 0.55 3.13 14.66 11.53 13.54 33.49 19.94
2009 20.95 0.91 0.17 1.08 2.17 12.76 14.93 17.87 16.47 34.35
Sales
All Goods
2007 11.90 – – – 0.68 5.73 5.05 11.22 18.83 7.61
2008 10.41 – – – 0.62 3.69 3.07 9.79 18.76 8.97
2009 7.61 – – – 0.72 3.07 2.35 8.33 10.67 19.00
Our elaborations from AIPS, SBS and FTS data. This decomposition follows from Eq (1). Data on births and deaths of ﬁrms are not
available, as a consequence the ﬁrm extensive margins are missing.
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ﬁrm entry/exit into account since we cannot be sure that exit and entry dynamics in the database
actually reveal true ﬁrm births and deaths.7 Thus, focusing on continuing ﬁrms, the decomposition
corresponds to the third term of Eq. (1), where variety p in this case just indexes a sold product. The6 We deﬁne as intermediates those products belonging to the Broad Economic Category (BEC) codes 111, 121, 21, 22, 31, 322,
42, 53. Capital goods are products included in the BEC codes 41 and 521. The remaining codes denote ﬁnal goods. It is worth
noting that according to this split, the so-called postponable goods may fall under both the intermediate and capital good
categories.
7 In the AIPS a ﬁrm’s exit from the database could stem from a change in the ﬁrm sector of activity or a decline in the number
of employed persons that determine a ﬁrm’s exit from the sampling threshold.
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the recession and, in particular, was solely responsible for the overall exports contraction in 2009
(Behrens et al., 2012; Bricongne et al., 2012; Aisen et al., 2012; Barba Navaretti et al., 2011; Wagner,
2012). Different evidence is unveiled instead for the positive evolution of ﬁnal goods exports and
imports and the contraction of capital goods imports that were importantly driven by the entry/exit of
ﬁrms from foreign markets and by the adding/dropping of some traded varieties. The table also
delivers another general feature of the extensive margin of trade: within a ﬁrm, product churning is
more pronounced than the ﬁrm entry and exit process, but its role is greatly reduced during the crisis.
An exception is represented by imports of capital goods, for which product droppings gained
importance during the crisis (Baldwin, 2009; Levchenko et al., 2010; Kolasa et al., 2010).
Exploring the role of ﬁrm heterogeneity. To understand if ﬁrm and product heterogeneity played a
different role during the recession compared to the pre-crisis period, we compute the changes of each
intensive margin between 2009 and 2008 and adopt the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of equality of their
distributions among ﬁrm and product groups.8 In the present work, extensive margins are deﬁned as
the ﬁrm export/import entry and exit rates and the probability to stop exporting/importing/selling a
good at ﬁrm-product level. Intensive margins are instead measured as the annual growth of ﬁrm and
ﬁrm-product exports/imports/sales. Here we focus on the intensive margins only, as the computation
of any extensive margin change over time lacks any kind of meaning.
Table B2 shows that exporters experienced a signiﬁcantly larger contraction between 2008 and
2009 in both ﬁrm and ﬁrm-product sales growth compared to non-exporters, and the same is true for
non-importers, domestic owned and small sized ﬁrms when compared to importers, foreign owned
and large ﬁrms, respectively. Also, ﬁrm trade growth between 2008 and 2009 contracted
signiﬁcantly more for larger, more productive ﬁrms, importers and foreign ﬁrms. The latter,
however, went through a lower contraction of import growth between 2008 and 2009 with respect to
domestic ﬁrms. This evidence hints at a relevant role of ﬁrm and product heterogeneity in the crisis,
but it does not allow us to identify the impact of each ﬁrm and product characteristic, ceteris paribus
Regression analysis may be more suitable for this aim and presents a larger scope of implementation,
as it permits to explore the signiﬁcance of ﬁrm and product heterogeneity in the evolution of the
extensive margins as well. In the remainder of the work our empirical strategy will thus rest on
regression model estimates.
3. Empirical strategy
To assess the impact of the crisis at the micro level, we follow a straightforward approach and
explore the above deﬁned extensive and intensive margins at ﬁrm and ﬁrm-product level for exports,
imports and sales. We then regress each margin on a bunch of ﬁrm characteristics in the previous year,
on a dummy indicator for the crisis and on their interaction in order to assess the overall effect of the
crisis and to test whether and to what extent the crisis had a heterogeneous impact on the economic
performance of different types of ﬁrms and goods. In this respect, our approach is very close to that
adopted by Behrens et al. (2012) and consists of a sort of difference-in-differences analysis where the
crisis is the treatment dummy whose interaction with ﬁrm and product characteristics allows for the
dissection of the differential treatment effect for some groups of observations vis-a`-vis the experience
of the counterfactual groups. As a consequence, we do not include ﬁrm ﬁxed effects in the empirical
models below, as this would cause a loss of identiﬁcation of the role of ﬁrm heteroeneity in the crisis.
Then, by simple OLS,9 we estimate the two following models for the ﬁrm and ﬁrm-product margins,8 A detailed deﬁnition of the margins is included in the upper panel of Table B1 in Appendix B.
9 For the extensive margins we chose to estimate a linear probability model instead of a probit model, since the former allows
for the inclusion of several dummy variables and their respective interactions. The STATA command inteff that calculates the
interaction effect and the corresponding standard error and z-statistic in logit and probit models has a very long computation
time and only treats one interaction at a time. Having more than one interaction and our computation time being constrained,
we prefer to tackle our empirical model by means of the more ﬂexible linear probability model. However, the adoption of probit
models for the restricted model without the interaction terms delivers the same insights and the relative results are available
upon request.
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q ft ¼ a þ b0Crisis þ b01W ft1Crisis þ g 0W ft1 þ 2 ft (2)
0 0 0 0q f pt ¼ a þ b0Crisis þ b 1W ft1Crisis þ g W ft1 þ b 2X f pt1Crisis þ f X f pt1 þ dp
þ 2 f pt (3)
In the above equation, qftmeasures ﬁrm extensive or intensive margins for ﬁrm i in year t, while qfpt
denotes the ﬁrm-product margins for ﬁrm f and product p10 in year t, with t=2008, 2009, as described
above. Crisis is the crisis dummy taking the value 1 in 2009 and zero otherwise, and W in both models
is a vector of one-year lagged ﬁrm characteristics11 which also includes a full set of two-digit sector
dummies. The lower panel of Table B1 in Appendix B describes our right-hand side variables, which
are the ﬁrm’s size, productivity, export and import status and foreign ownership. Table B3 in the
Appendix displays the summary descriptive statistics for our regressors. In the estimation of the ﬁrm-
product margins, X includes two dummies identifying the economic category of exported/imported/
sold good – capital or intermediates, with ﬁnal goods treated as reference group – and its weight in the
ﬁrm’s total export/import/turnover value. The deﬁnition of the latter regressor depends on the
explored outcome: when the ﬁrm product sale margins are estimated, the regressor will measure the
weight of that product in the ﬁrm’s total production, while it will measure the weight of that product
in the ﬁrm exports or imports when we investigate the export and import margins at ﬁrm-product
level. Finally, dp represents product ﬁxed effects, while 2ft and 2fpt are ﬁrm and ﬁrm-product
idiosyncratic shocks.
In the following section, the upper panel – panel A – of each table will also show the results from
the estimation of models 2 and 3 when the restriction b1=b2=0 is imposed, thus assuming a
homogeneous effect of the crisis across ﬁrms in order to deliver a ﬁrst overview of its average impact
across ﬁrms and ﬁrm-product pairs.12 In panel B, on the other hand, we let the crisis heterogeneously
affect ﬁrms and products according to their characteristics.
4. Results
Exports and sales. Table 3 shows the evolution and the determinants of export margins at ﬁrm and
ﬁrm-product level. Columns 1–5 display the results for total exports, while columns 6–10 refer to
regular exports. Also, in order to compare the evolution of exports and turnover, we report the results
for total sales in the last three columns.
From panel A it emerges that, after controlling for ﬁrm and product level covariates, the global
economic slowdown in 2009 did not reduce either overall or regular exports through the ﬁrm
extensive margin. Indeed, during the crisis the probability of entry in foreign markets did not
signiﬁcantly change with respect to the previous period and, when total exports are considered, the
ﬁrm probability to stop exporting in fact decreased. In addition, in line with the existing evidence on
the positive association between ﬁrm importing and exporting (Kasahara and Lapham, 2008; Muuˆls
and Pisu, 2009; Aristei et al., 2013; Lo Turco and Maggioni, 2013) which may prove more important
under the economic downturn (Behrens et al., 2012), from panel B it emerges that importers were
actually more likely to start exporting in the recession. The likeliness of the drop of a product from the
ﬁrm export basket was however increased by the crisis, thus contributing to explain the export slump,
even if this result is not conﬁrmed for regular exports. Panel B reveals that the contraction in the
overall export scope is mainly concentrated in intermediate goods, especially in ﬁrms’ marginal
product varieties, and is mainly attributable to larger ﬁrms. The latter also display a higher probability10 As previously stated, in this analysis trade products are deﬁned with the 6-digit harmonised GTIP classiﬁcation, while sold
products are still deﬁned with the 10-digit PRODTR classiﬁcation.
11 In the analysis of export and import margins we dropped the ﬁrm export and import dummies respectively among the
explanatory variables.
12 In order to display the different average ﬁrm-product extensive and intensive margins for intermediates and capital goods,
product ﬁxed effects are not included in the speciﬁcations of panel A. However, their inclusion does not lead to sensitively
different results.
Table 3
Extensive and intensive margins of exports.
Total exports Regular exports Sales
Extensive margins Intensive margins Extensive margins Intensive margins Extensive margins Intensive margins
Startx Stopx Dropx Dxf Dxfp Startx
reg
Sto px
reg
Dro px
reg
Dxregf Dx
reg
f p Drop
y Dyf Dyfp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Panel A
Crisis 0.002 0.011** 0.014*** 0.167*** 0.116*** 0.003 0.011 0.01 0.070** 0.083*** 0.022*** 0.198*** 0.162***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.005] [0.024] [0.019] [0.004] [0.007] [0.008] [0.035] [0.031] [0.004] [0.008] [0.012]
sizet1 0.031***
[0.004]
0.023***
[0.002]
0.031***
[0.003]
0.008
[0.011]
0.016*
[0.009]
0.011***
[0.003]
0.028***
[0.004]
0.042***
[0.004]
0.01
[0.015]
0.028**
[0.013]
0.032***
[0.002]
0.025***
[0.005]
0.001
[0.006]
lpt1 0.015***
[0.004]
0.025***
[0.003]
0.021***
[0.004]
0.001
[0.016]
0.007
[0.011]
0.004
[0.003]
0.022***
[0.005]
0.029***
[0.006]
0.019
[0.024]
0.023
[0.018]
0.010***
[0.002]
0.008
[0.006]
0.009
[0.008]
expt1 0.008*
[0.004]
0.036***
[0.009]
0.024*
[0.014]
impt1 0.137***
[0.008]
0.066***
[0.008]
0.073***
[0.010]
0.044
[0.030]
0.047*
[0.027]
0.065***
[0.005]
0.094***
[0.012]
0.082***
[0.013]
0.084*
[0.046]
0.077*
[0.041]
0.008*
[0.005]
0.014
[0.010]
0.033**
[0.014]
foreignt1 0.050
[0.033]
0.023***
[0.007]
0.025*
[0.013]
0.055
[0.039]
0.022
[0.033]
0.004
[0.017]
0.041***
[0.012]
0.038**
[0.016]
0.076
[0.058]
0.009
[0.055]
0.016*
[0.009]
0.015
[0.016]
0.014
[0.026]
sharet1 0.490***
[0.007]
0.457***
[0.021]
0.162***
[0.011]
0.251***
[0.038]
0.189***
[0.004]
0.195***
[0.014]
intermt1 0.079***
[0.006]
0.024
[0.017]
0.005
[0.009]
0.056*
[0.029]
0.005
[0.004]
0.002
[0.011]
capitalt1 0.175***
[0.008]
0.01
[0.024]
0.042***
[0.014]
0.051
[0.047]
0.013**
[0.007]
0.057***
[0.017]
R2 0.072 0.037 0.069 0.006 0.007 0.032 0.037 0.047 0.004 0.005 0.06 0.031 0.011
Panel B
Crisis 0.108 0.011 0.128** 0.754** 0.552** 0.017 0.07 0.014 0.659 0.963** 0.055 0.317*** 0.075
[0.076] [0.065] [0.060] [0.341] [0.230] [0.052] [0.096] [0.093] [0.490] [0.413] [0.045] [0.117] [0.157]
sizet1 0.035***
[0.007]
0.028***
[0.003]
0.042***
[0.004]
0.022
[0.015]
0.006
[0.013]
0.015***
[0.004]
0.033***
[0.005]
0.047***
[0.007]
0.004
[0.022]
0.034
[0.022]
0.028***
[0.003]
0.001
[0.006]
0.01
[0.010]
sizet1C 0.01
[0.009]
0.009*
[0.005]
0.011**
[0.005]
0.026
[0.024]
0.021
[0.018]
0.008
[0.005]
0.01
[0.007]
0.001
[0.007]
0.028
[0.035]
0.012
[0.031]
0.006
[0.004]
0.043***
[0.010]
0.02
[0.013]
lpt1 0.019***
[0.006]
0.022***
[0.005]
0.031***
[0.005]
0.043*
[0.022]
0.006
[0.017]
0.003
[0.004]
0.016**
[0.007]
0.035***
[0.009]
0.068*
[0.036]
0.041
[0.033]
0.010**
[0.004]
0.015*
[0.008]
0.01
[0.013]
lpt1C 0.006
[0.007]
0.006
[0.007]
0.009
[0.007]
0.083**
[0.035]
0.051**
[0.024]
0.002
[0.005]
0.013
[0.010]
0.002
[0.010]
0.091*
[0.051]
0.093**
[0.042]
0.005
[0.005]
0.01
[0.013]
0.012
[0.016]
expt1 0.008
[0.006]
0.040***
[0.012]
0.032
[0.021]
expt1C 0.014*
[0.008]
0.007
[0.019]
0.009
[0.029]
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impt1 0.114***
[0.011]
0.065***
[0.011]
0.069***
[0.012]
0.001
[0.044]
0.070*
[0.040]
0.054***
[0.007]
0.092***
[0.017]
0.081***
[0.018]
0.079
[0.069]
0.075
[0.068]
0.002
[0.007]
0.007
[0.013]
0.051**
[0.023]
impt1C 0.048***
[0.016]
0.003
[0.015]
0.005
[0.014]
0.085
[0.067]
0.049
[0.060]
0.023**
[0.010]
0.002
[0.023]
0.011
[0.023]
0.005
[0.100]
0.034
[0.096]
0.005
[0.009]
0.043**
[0.021]
0.072**
[0.032]
foreignt1 0.062
[0.046]
0.023**
[0.010]
0.003
[0.014]
0.029
[0.057]
0.066
[0.053]
0.01
[0.024]
0.053***
[0.017]
0.008
[0.025]
0.150*
[0.091]
0.002
[0.109]
0.007
[0.013]
0.035*
[0.020]
0.06
[0.041]
foreignt1C 0.02
[0.060]
0.001
[0.013]
0.028*
[0.016]
0.057
[0.086]
0.046
[0.072]
0.013
[0.033]
0.025
[0.023]
0.013
[0.026]
0.136
[0.127]
0.021
[0.126]
0.001
[0.015]
0.042
[0.034]
0.075
[0.053]
sharet1 0.443***
[0.009]
0.546***
[0.031]
0.134***
[0.017]
0.409***
[0.071]
0.198***
[0.007]
0.272***
[0.024]
sharet1C 0.031***
[0.011]
0.058
[0.044]
0.018
[0.021]
0.017
[0.092]
0
[0.008]
0.019
[0.031]
intermt1C 0.020**
[0.009]
0.180***
[0.039]
0.036**
[0.016]
0.277***
[0.071]
0.013**
[0.007]
0.185***
[0.025]
capitalt1C 0.008
[0.011]
0.194***
[0.058]
0.074***
[0.026]
0.384***
[0.116]
0.023**
[0.011]
0.204***
[0.041]
R2 0.076 0.038 0.133 0.011 0.047 0.034 0.04 0.212 0.011 0.137 0.143 0.04 0.064
Obs. 12,788 16,617 157,525 15,618 83,649 19,339 9,874 15,192 8200 11,361 58,144 29,405 50,885
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at 1% level. Robust Standard errors are in brackets. All regressors are one year lags of the variables. ‘‘C’’ denotes the
interaction of a variablewith the Crisis dummy. All estimations for both extensive and intensivemargins are obtained byOLS. Regressions in columns 3, 5, 8, 10 in Panel B include 6 digit GTIP
product ﬁxed effects, while columns 11 and 13 in Panel B include 10 digit PRODTR product ﬁxed effects.
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A. Lo Turco, D. Maggioni / Economic Systems 38 (2014) 397–414406to leave the export market in the turmoil, even if the coefﬁcient on the interaction of the crisis dummy
and ﬁrm size is barely signiﬁcant and its signiﬁcance fades away when regular exports are considered.
This contrasting ﬁnding for regular exports hints at the possibility that the worse performance of
larger ﬁrms in the overall export intensive margins is mostly driven by their role of carry-along-
traders and by the contraction of their trade intermediary activity. Our data also show slight evidence
of a greater resilience of foreign-owned ﬁrms in preserving their position in speciﬁc product markets
abroad.
Intensive margins of exports have been more seriously hit by the crisis than extensive ones.
However, comparing the crisis coefﬁcients for total and regular exports in panel A it is evident
that the turmoil was much less detrimental for regular exports than for the total ones. Overall
export growth decreased by 17% at ﬁrm level (12% at ﬁrm-product level) compared to regular
exports which record a fall of 7% (8%). CAT activity thus played an important role in shaping
the intensive margin response of exports for the Turkish economy. The overall negative shock on
the intensive margin, from panel B, seems to originate from the bad performance of more
productive ﬁrms and heavily involves capital and intermediate goods, especially when regular
exports are considered.
After having investigated the evolution of export turnover, the last three columns of Table 3 explore
whether overall sales followed the same negative evolution experienced by exports within each ﬁrm
and product grouping and to which extent the domestic market was able to cushion the shock suffered
in foreign markets.
Panel A delivers contrary messages for the extensive and intensive margins of sales. During the
crisis, while both ﬁrm and ﬁrm-product sales growth fell, ﬁrms were surprisingly less likely to drop
products from their product scope. This ﬁnding brings to mind the non-signiﬁcant average impact
of the crisis on the dropping of regular exports and was expected from the above decomposition of
sales (see Table 2). Firms may indeed have initiated a process of product diversiﬁcation in order to
cope with the changing foreign scenario. This could reﬂect the need to redirect sales towards
different destination markets located in geographical areas less affected by the crisis and
characterised by better growth perspectives (Uygur, 2010). In addition, panel B shows that
intermediate and capital goods were less damaged and, turning to ﬁrm heterogeneity, larger ﬁrms
and importers exhibited a greater resilience to the crisis, since they expanded their sales.
Comparing this evidence to that on exports from the previous columns, it turns out that domestic
sales drove the better performance of large ﬁrms and limited the drop in intermediate and capital
goods demand. This could hint at the positive impact of some policy interventions on the internal
market, such as the temporary consumption tax cuts on durables–usually produced by larger
ﬁrms–that were implemented by the Turkish government starting from the second quarter of 2009
(Misch and Seymen, 2012). The evidence also shows that exporters more frequently dropped a
product from the product mix during the crisis; however, their total sales were no more negatively
affected than those of non-exporters. This supports the hypothesis that the crisis has brought about
an important churning activity in the product scope of exporters and probably in their destination
markets as well.
Imports. Turning to the evidence on imports, from panel A of Table 4 it emerges that imports were
hit more seriously than exports at the ﬁrm extensive margin. As a matter of fact, in line with our
decomposition exercise in Section 2, the crisis reduced the probability to start importing by 1.7% and
increased the probability to stop importing by 1.9%. By the same token, compared to the ﬁndings on
exports, panel A of the table displays a higher elasticity of the drop probability of import products with
respect to the crisis (4% compared to the 1.4% estimated for exports). At the intensive margin, the
reduction in ﬁrm and ﬁrm-product import growth was also signiﬁcant and larger than that recorded
for exports (26% and 19% compared to 17% and 12%).
When the crisis dummy is interacted with the ﬁrm level variables in panel B of Table 4, we ﬁnd that
the overall slump in the ﬁrm extensive margin is attributable to larger ﬁrms and exporters. Under
uncertainty, large ﬁrms may contract their orders and nevertheless maintain their sales making use of
their larger inventory (Alessandria et al., 2010). The result on exporters instead reveals that the
adverse foreign demand shock which affected them propagated to their demand for imports.
Furthermore, ceteris paribus, more productive ﬁrms were less likely to leave the import market in the
Table 4
Extensive and intensive margins of imports.
Extensive margins Intensive margins
Startm Stopm Dropm ~mf Dmfp
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A
Crisis 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.043*** 0.260*** 0.191***
[0.006] [0.005] [0.003] [0.026] [0.014]
sizet1 0.050***
[0.005]
0.064***
[0.002]
0.038***
[0.002]
0.024**
[0.010]
0.036***
[0.006]
lpt1 0.037***
[0.004]
0.048***
[0.003]
0.044***
[0.003]
0.019
[0.015]
0.000
[0.007]
expt1 0.138***
[0.008]
0.100***
[0.007]
0.066***
[0.007]
0.032
[0.031]
0.104***
[0.019]
foreignt1 0.061
[0.038]
0.021***
[0.007]
0.076***
[0.007]
0.028
[0.033]
0.002
[0.019]
rel_sht1 0.345***
[0.008]
0.754***
[0.022]
intermt1 0.097***
[0.008]
0.060**
[0.024]
capitalt1 0.088***
[0.009]
0.109***
[0.027]
R2 0.076 0.096 0.057 0.011 0.011
Panel B
Crisis 0.116 0.116* 0.049 0.399 0.371*
[0.081] [0.070] [0.043] [0.342] [0.191]
sizet1 0.066***
[0.008]
0.068***
[0.003]
0.047***
[0.002]
0.025*
[0.015]
0.027***
[0.008]
sizet1C 0.026***
[0.010]
0.007*
[0.004]
0.002
[0.002]
0.006
[0.024]
0.018*
[0.011]
lpt1 0.039***
[0.006]
0.037***
[0.005]
0.042***
[0.004]
0.053**
[0.021]
0.007
[0.012]
lpt1C 0.004
[0.008]
0.022***
[0.007]
0.001
[0.004]
0.067**
[0.032]
0.036*
[0.019]
expt1 0.132***
[0.011]
0.114***
[0.010]
0.067***
[0.009]
0.022
[0.046]
0.063**
[0.025]
expt1C 0.012
[0.015]
0.031**
[0.014]
0.002
[0.010]
0.106
[0.071]
0.117***
[0.041]
foreignt1 0.102**
[0.052]
0.012
[0.009]
0.069***
[0.009]
0.064
[0.049]
0.006
[0.028]
foreignt1C 0.074
[0.067]
0.016
[0.011]
0.011
[0.008]
0.069
[0.075]
0.041
[0.038]
sharet1 0.278***
[0.011]
0.865***
[0.035]
sharet1C 0.016
[0.012]
0.184***
[0.045]
intermt1C 0.002
[0.009]
0.043
[0.047]
capitalt1C 0.008
[0.010]
0.014
[0.056]
R2 0.08 0.1 0.131 0.016 0.036
Obs. 12,067 17,338 278,717 15,954 154,210
* Signiﬁcant at 10% level; ** signiﬁcant at 5% level; *** signiﬁcant at 1% level. Robust Standard errors are in brackets. All regressors
are one year lags of the variables. All estimations for both extensive and intensive margins are obtained by OLS. Regressions in
columns 3 and 5 in Panel B include 6 digit GTIP product ﬁxed effects
A. Lo Turco, D. Maggioni / Economic Systems 38 (2014) 397–414 407crisis even if their import activity was negatively affected at both the ﬁrm and ﬁrm-product intensive
margin.
It follows that even if more efﬁcient ﬁrms did not break their business relationships with foreign
suppliers, probably due to the difﬁculty of ﬁnding an input substitute in the domestic market for their
high quality production, they reduced the economic importance of their international purchases.
A. Lo Turco, D. Maggioni / Economic Systems 38 (2014) 397–414408In line with the inventory explanation, foreign inputs accounting for the highest share in total
foreign purchases experienced the lowest growth. The economic destination of the imported goods
did not contribute to explaining the evolution of import products either at extensive or intensive
margins. The latter result is surprising and could be driven by the very small number of import
products in the reference category – consumer goods – which could affect the signiﬁcance of the shift
parameters for intermediate and capital goods.
5. Summary of the ﬁndings and discussion
The main question we addressed in our work is the role played by ﬁrm and product heterogeneity
in the Turkish manufacturing response to the crisis. Most of our results fulﬁl some of the hypotheses
outlined and reﬂect the existing empirical evidence discussed in the introduction. Nevertheless, some
important differences have emerged and some new insights may be gathered from the bulk of our
evidence. In this section we intend to present an overview of our main ﬁndings and to discuss their
main implications. Firm heterogeneity.
- Size and efﬁciency. In line with most of the ﬁrm level evidence we ﬁnd that ﬁrm size did play a role in
shaping the ﬁrms’ responses to the crisis (Wagner, 2012; Bricongne et al., 2012; Aisen et al., 2012;
Behrens et al., 2012). However, our evidence shows that, under the global downturn, large ﬁrms
signiﬁcantly contracted the extensive margin of exports only. As discussed in the introduction,
although one might expect a better performance of large ﬁrms in the crisis, they are more likely to
trade those products that are more exposed to the crisis, such as capital and other postponable goods
which imply the exploitation of scale economies. Yet larger ﬁrms may have a larger export basket
and may then importantly adjust their export product scope in order to cope with the adverse
external shocks. From another perspective, the lack of any evidence of a more detrimental shock to
larger ﬁrms’ regular exports points to the relevance of their role as trade intermediaries for other
manufacturing ﬁrms. The drop of some export products may simply reveal indirect exporters’
inability to sell their products during the crisis or the worsening of their economic performance. The
evidence on more productive ﬁrms experiencing a worse performance than less productive ones in
the crisis mimics the ﬁnding on Belgian ﬁrms by Behrens et al. (2012) and reveals that they are
responsible for part of the export intensive margin slump. More productive ﬁrms tend to export to
high income markets (Crino` and Epifani, 2012), which were hit most in the crisis. As a consequence,
more efﬁcient ﬁrms may have been more affected by the inward shift of high income partners, which
implies a reduction of their export sales.- International exposure of ﬁrms. Surprisingly enough, we ﬁnd no relevant role of foreign
ownership in the evolution of trade and turnover in the crisis. This ﬁnding is in contrast with
evidence provided by Kolasa et al. (2010) and Alfaro and Chen (2012), while it is very close to the
work of Behrens et al. (2012). As far as ﬁrm access to import markets is concerned we show that
importing, as expected, favours export activity in the crisis. Imported inputs may foster export
activity thanks to the existence of common sunk costs and/or the enhancement of
competitiveness occurring through cost saving or technology transfer (Kasahara and Lapham,
2008; Muuˆls and Pisu, 2009; Aristei et al., 2013; Lo Turco and Maggioni, 2013). We show that this
linkage is strengthened during the crisis. Indeed, the crisis represents a reduction in the ﬂow of
expected proﬁts, and if ﬁrms sourcing inputs abroad face lower sunk and/or marginal costs
compared to non-importers, they may still ﬁnd exporting a rewarding activity. The positive
relationship between importing and exporting in the crisis brings to mind the ﬁnding by Behrens
et al. (2012); however, the latter study indicates a signiﬁcant impact of import on the intensive
margin, while we ﬁnd this beneﬁcial effect only for the extensive margin. Finally, we ﬁnd that,
possibly due to the slump in the demand for exports, exporters tend to withdraw from the import
market and contract their sales. This result is in line with our expectation of a propagation of the
crisis from the export slump to import demand. Product heterogeneity. Apart from productivity, further ﬁrm characteristics do not appear to have
shaped the crisis impact on export growth at the intensive margin. As highlighted by Behrens et al.
A. Lo Turco, D. Maggioni / Economic Systems 38 (2014) 397–414 409(2012) for the Belgian case, this suggests that supply side factors were possibly secondary compared
to the role played by the global demand collapse in the evolution of Turkish manufacturing between
2008 and 2009. In this direction, especially for regular exports, our evidence shows that most of the
export growth slowdown in the crisis is absorbed by capital and intermediate goods, recalling the
ﬁndings on the relevant role of international vertical linkages (Levchenko et al., 2010) which helped
the propagation of the fall in the demand for postponable goods. Our evidence corroborates this
view for the Turkish economy and is in line with all the existing abovementioned ﬁrm level evidence
on the 2009 crisis.
Some important and original implications emerge from all this evidence. First, our detailed
analysis of extensive margin determinants reveals some important features of the relevance of
sunk costs and their asymmetric importance on the supply of exports and the demand for imports.
From our ﬁndings, we can infer that the exit from foreign destination markets entails the loss of the
export sunk costs already borne by the ﬁrm. Firms could then work towards defending their
market position abroad and avoid facing further burdensome costs in the future. On the contrary,
exporters may adjust their export baskets and drop some products, especially if they are marginal
varieties and/or originate from intermediary activity. However, as documented by our
decompositions above, while the extensive margins played a limited role in the export slump,
they emerged as an important driver of the contraction in import demand. On one hand, this may
indicate that a relevant restructuring process occurred in Turkish imports with a reduction in the
number of importers in total and in each product-market combination. On the other hand, and
more likely in our view, it may only reveal that under uncertainty ﬁrms hinge more on inventories
and less on foreign purchases. All this, however, implies an asymmetry in international buyer-
supplier relationships where the burden of international tie building seems to be borne by the
seller more than the buyer. This interpretation is in line with some recent empirical and theoretical
works on the process of export market entry and penetration (Rauch and Watson, 2003; Eaton
et al., 2008, 2011b; Arkolakis, 2010). If foreign source and destination markets are characterised by
a high degree of competition, it is rather likely that ﬁrms may ﬁnd it harder to acquire new
customers than to ﬁnd new intermediate suppliers. The only exception emerges for high
productivity ﬁrms whose production is likely to be rather high quality and whose suppliers, as a
consequence, could be more difﬁcult to substitute.
Secondly, the role of CAT activity in the Turkish export collapse seems to have been quite
important. Regular export ﬂows were not negatively affected at extensive margins and underwent
lower contractions at intensive margins compared to CAT ﬂows. Comparing the evidence for
regular exports to that on overall exports, it also emerges that larger ﬁrms were more likely to drop
an export product and leave the export market during the crisis because they stopped or reduced
their activity as trade intermediaries. Also, from the comparison of the coefﬁcients on the
economic destination of goods, the export collapse of CAT activities seems to be relatively more
related to the trading of ﬁnal goods, while regular exports dropped essentially in intermediate and
capital goods. All this calls for a further inspection of the role played by CAT activity in the export
collapse of other countries as well.
Finally, what further message can we gather from the speciﬁc experience of Turkey in the 2009
crisis? Since our results suggest that the domestic market contributed to cushion the negative
shock suffered by Turkish ﬁrms in foreign markets, our work provides an interesting implication in
times of austerity. As a matter of fact, exporters did not face any reduction in their intensive
margins of overall sales during the crisis. Also, larger ﬁrms and importers seem to have beneﬁted in
particular by domestic demand, actually displaying a better overall sales growth, but there is no
signiﬁcant difference in their exports with respect to smaller ﬁrms and non-importers. All this,
together with the country’s rapid recovery after 2009, could be interpreted as an indirect proof of
the positive effect of the ﬁscal stimulus provided by the Turkish government in the form of a
temporary consumption tax cut on durables which was implemented from the second quarter of
2009 (Misch and Seymen, 2012). The Turkish experience therefore provides an important lesson for
developing and emerging economies whose development strategies rest heavily on deep
integration in the global economy, as it highlights that in order to be resilient in the occurrence
A. Lo Turco, D. Maggioni / Economic Systems 38 (2014) 397–414410of a dramatic negative external shock countries need to preserve some scope for an autonomous
domestic policy.
6. Concluding remarks
The present work contributes to the new and still limited ﬁrm level literature on the recent crisis by
providing evidence on the response of Turkish manufacturing ﬁrms.
The separate analysis of trade margins unveiled the existence of important asymmetries in the
reaction of exports and imports to an external shock. As a matter of fact, ﬁrm and ﬁrm-product
level extensive margins had a rather relevant role in shaping the dramatic slump in imports that
characterised the Turkish economy in 2009. Also, the investigation of the ﬁrm level drivers of such
a drop showed that the position of Turkey in the international supply chains may well have played
a role: the sudden drop in foreign demand propagated the contraction of the exporters’
intermediate purchases abroad and the most affected good categories were intermediate and
capital goods.
The analysis of the export evolution also revealed some important ﬁndings. First of all, the
contraction of foreign sales was counteracted by the extensive margin, which was prominently driven
by the ﬁrm import activity, which became more relevant when the market size shrank and the
competitive pressure became tougher. Secondly, the intensive margin was partially shaped by the
performance of more productive ﬁrms’ sales abroad, possibly due to their focus on the most affected
product-market segments. Also, postponable goods were subjected to the largest fall. Finally, but more
importantly, our work delivers unprecedented evidence on the evolution of produced and non-
produced exports in the aftermath of the global turmoil. Regular exporters were more resilient than
CAT ones. This ﬁnding calls, in general, for a more thorough understanding of ﬁrm export activity and,
in particular, hints at the need to assess to what extent the global trade collapse was driven by the
pervasiveness of CAT activity which, in the case of the Turkish and other economies, represents an
important fraction of total exports.
Moreover, our investigation suggests that the internal market cushioned the drop in foreign
demand for postponable goods: larger ﬁrms indeed showed greater resilience in their overall turnover
in 2009 compared to the contraction of their export activity. This hints at the effectiveness of the
country’s temporary ﬁscal policy measures and at the important role of domestic institutions in
curbing a negative foreign demand shock.
In conclusion, the analysis of Turkish manufacturing during the crisis may be considered as a
natural experiment that provides the chance to observe if and how ﬁrm heterogeneity matters
when the economy is under stress. Also, the 2009 contraction of Turkish manufacturing appears
to be deeply rooted in the position of this economy in international production networks.
Although we show how such supply chains contributed to the spur of the demand downturn
from the largest importing countries to the more peripheral suppliers, the observed resilience
of larger ﬁrms in their domestic sales and the overall quick recovery of the Turkish real sector
after 2009 suggest that domestic demand side policies may still play a fundamental role. This
should call for a deep reﬂection on the recent widespread adoption of austerity measures in
Europe.
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Appendix A. Data sources
We make use of three different data sources to build up our sample.
Structural Business Statistics (SBS). The Annual Industry and Service Statistics collect information on
ﬁrm incomes, input costs, employment, investment activity, the primary 4 digit NACE (rev 1.1) sector
of activity and the region of location over the period 2003–2008 which deliver the ﬁrm level
characteristics used as controls in our estimations. These data cover the whole population of ﬁrms
with more than 20 employees and a representative sample of ﬁrms with less than 20 employees. The
economic activities that are included in the survey are those in the NACE sections from C to K and from
M to O. Also, the data cover all ﬁrms with more than one local unit regardless of the number of
employees and all ﬁrms in the following sectors: C, E and I.
Foreign Trade Statistics (FTS). Foreign trade ﬂows at ﬁrm level provided by TurkStat are sourced from
customs declarations and are available for the 2002–2009 time span. The import and export ﬂows are
collected for the universe of the importers and exporters of goods at 12-digit GTIP classiﬁcation:13 the
ﬁrst 8 digits correspond to the CN classiﬁcation, and the last 4 digits are national. Additionally, the
information on the origin/destination countries of trade ﬂows is available.
Annual Industrial Product Statistics (AIPS). The TurkStat Annual Industrial Product Statistics contain
information on the type and number of produced goods, their volume and value of production
together with the total quantity and value of total sales from goods produced within the reference year
or preceding years. Product data are available for the years 2005–2009 and are collected at 10-digit
PRODTR level,14 a national product classiﬁcation with the ﬁrst 8 digits corresponding to the PRODCOM
classiﬁcation. Production data are available for ﬁrms with more than 20 persons employed and whose
primary or secondary activity is either in C section (Mining & Quarrying) or D section (Manufacturing)
of NACE Rev 1.1. This database allows us to identify the ﬁrm product scope, sales and exports of goods
that the ﬁrm in fact produces.
Appendix B. Additional tables and ﬁgures
See Tables B1–B3.Table B1
Variables deﬁnition and description.
q Description
Extensive margin
Startx Probability to start exporting measured as a dummy taking value 1 if the ﬁrm exports in t and
did not export in t1
Startx
reg
Probability to start exporting own products measured as a dummy taking value 1 if the ﬁrm
exports own products in t and did not export in t1
Startm Probability to start importing measured as a dummy taking value 1 if the ﬁrm imports in t
and did not import in t1
Stopx Probability to stop exporting measured as a dummy taking value 1 if the ﬁrm stops to export
in t and exported in t1
Sto px
reg
Probability to stop exporting own products measured as a dummy taking value 1 if the ﬁrm
stops to export own products in t and exported own products in t1
13 This classiﬁcation undergoes some changes every year and has been harmonised over time following the procedure
suggested in Pierce and Schott (2009).
14 The PRODTR classiﬁcation is the 2006 one, thus it is homogeneous across the years and does not require any harmonisation
procedure.
Table B1 (Continued )
q Description
Stopm Probability to stop importing measured as a dummy taking value 1 if the ﬁrm stops to import
in t and imported in t1
Dropx Probability to drop an export product measured as a dummy taking value 1 if the ﬁrm drops
the product export in t and was exporting it in t1
Dro px
reg
Probability to drop a produced export product measured as a dummy taking value 1 if the
ﬁrm drops the own product export in t and was exporting it in t1
Dropy Probability to drop a product from the product mix measured as a dummy taking value 1 if
the ﬁrm drops the product in t and was producing it in t1
Dropm Probability to drop an import product measured as a dummy taking value 1 if the ﬁrm drops
the product import in t and was importing it in t1
Intensive margin
Dxf/fp Annual growth of ﬁrm or ﬁrm-product level exports measured as the log change in export
sales
Dxreg
f = f p
Annual growth of ﬁrm or ﬁrm-product level produced exports measured as the log change in
produced export sales
Dyf/fp Annual growth of ﬁrm or ﬁrm-product level sales measured as the log change in total sales
Dmf/fp Annual growth of ﬁrm or ﬁrm-product level imports measured as the log change in imported
purchases
W Description
Crisis/C Dummy taking value 1 in year 2009 and 0 otherwise
size Firm size measured as the log of the number of employees
lp Labour productivity measured as the log of real value added per worker
exp Exporter dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm exports in that year and 0 otherwise.
imp Importer dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm imports and 0 otherwise
foreign Foreign ownership dummy equal to 1 if the ﬁrm is foreign owned
X Description
interm Dummy equal to 1 if a product is an intermediate good and 0 otherwise. We deﬁne
intermediates those products included in the BEC codes 111, 121, 21, 22, 31, 322, 42, 53
capital Dummy equal to 1 if a product is a capital good and 0 otherwise, We deﬁne capital goods
those products included in the BEC codes 41 and 521
share Share of the product in the total ﬁrm output/exports/produced exports/imports
Table B2
Kolmogorow–Smirnov Test on the change of intensive margins between 2009 and 2008.
Firm level margins
2009/2008 change in
Dxf Dx
reg
f Dyf Dmf
All ﬁrms 0.333 0.245 0.236 0.380
Large ﬁrm 0.404 0.282 0.202 0.413
Small ﬁrm 0.298 0.224 0.247 0.359
P-value 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000
High productivity 0.373 0.277 0.255 0.428
Low productivity 0.280 0.199 0.227 0.300
P-value 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000
Exporter – – 0.239 0.420
Non exporter – – 0.233 0.226
P-value – – 0.000 0.000
Importer 0.364 0.247 0.223 –
Non importer 0.195 0.234 0.256 –
P-value 0.000 0.151 0.000 –
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Firm level margins
2009/2008 change in
Dxf Dx
reg
f
Dyf Dmf
Foreign 0.434 0.258 0.189 0.331
Domestic 0.326 0.244 0.238 0.384
P-value 0.002 0.041 0.000 0.000
Firm-product level margins
2009/2008 change in
Dxfp Dx
reg
f p Dyfp Dmfp
All ﬁrms 0.413 0.279 0.250 0.400
Large ﬁrm 0.448 0.274 0.225 0.431
Small ﬁrm 0.371 0.282 0.260 0.319
P-value 0.074 0.035 0.000 0.000
High productivity 0.464 0.327 0.285 0.423
Low productivity 0.338 0.216 0.218 0.366
P-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Exporter – – 0.253 0.412
Non exporter – – 0.246 0.243
P-value – – 0.000 0.000
Importer 0.414 0.271 0.242 –
Non importer 0.404 0.330 0.265 –
P-value 0.713 0.040 0.000 –
Foreign 0.423 0.341 0.180 0.429
Domestic 0.411 0.273 0.253 0.389
P-value 0.397 0.028 0.000 0.000
Capital 0.473 0.552 0.334 0.496
Interm/ﬁnal 0.406 0.246 0.237 0.396
P-value 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000
The equality of distributions of the change in each intensive margin between 2009 and 2008 is tested among different ﬁrm and
product groups.
Both the values of the change in margins and the p-value of the Kolmogorow–Smirnov tests are reported.
As far as the ﬁrm size and productivity are concerned, we test the equality of distributions in the change of a given margin
between large (with at least 100 employees) and small (with less than 100 employees) ﬁrms and between high productive (with
productivity above the median) and low productive (with productivity below the median) ﬁrms.
Table B3
Descriptive statistics of the regressors.
Variable Observations Mean S.E. Min Max
sizet1 30,943 3.974 0.968 2.995 9.615
lpt1 29,872 9.558 0.848 2.372 14.631
expt1 31,006 0.553 0.497 0 1
impt1 31,006 0.578 0.494 0 1
foreignt1 30,500 0.039 0.193 0 1
The table reports the average (Mean), standard deviation (S.E.), minimum (Min) and maximum (Max) values of the one-year lags
of ﬁrm variables.
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